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URBAN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES:
A STOCHASTIC MODEL
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Fiscal Affairs Department,

International

Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 20431

(Received 6 July 1969)
A behavioral model is presented to identify the linkages between urban social structure
and urban public expenditure data. The model is then tested on data from the 198 largest
U.S. cities using first a principal components analysis to dimension the structural variables
and second a regression model to measure the covariation between urban spending and selected
measures of urban structure. The results suggest a relevant set of considerations for planning
the urban fist for purposes of State and Federal intergovernmental
policy as well as for
purposes of urban physical planning.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE
INCREASINGLY
critical fiscal position of metropolitan
core cities may be partially traced
to three basic factors, neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive, but all manifestations of the increasing complexities of the urban form. The first is the problem of
externalities, encompassing
such issues as the urban-suburban
exploitation
hypothesis, the
fragmentation
of local government,
and the many corollaries of these two. The second is
the rapid change in the demographic,
economic, and ethnic composition
of the core city
population
which has occurred over the past twenty years. The third dimension
of the
urban fiscal problem is the revealed inability of state governments
to adapt policy to the
changing needs of metropolitan
America.
The concern in this paper is with only one side of the fiscal crisis of American citiesthat of public expenditures.
The objective here is to explain, first conceptually
and then
statistically, the relatively wide variance which exists among metropolitan
core cities in per
capita expenditures.
Moreover, the intention here is to structure this explanation in terms
of the first two general issues stated above : various among cities in the degree of interaction
among residents within an SMSA : and variations
among cities in the demographic,
economic and sociological structure.
The justification
for examining this question in some
detail is clear. Only when the determinants
of city government spending levels are identified
and their relative magnitudes weighed can either state and federal assistance programs or
local revenue reforms effectively correct the public finance deficiencies of core cities.
Moreover, it is argued here that a rather detailed quantitative
analysis is an imperative
first step to understanding
the complex urban structure and its relationship
to urban
finance.
Accordingly,
our quantitative
approach
involves first a dimensioning
of the
characteristics
of core cities via a principal components
analysis;
second, an estimation
of
the covariation
between these dimensions and urban spending via a single equation least
squares model.

* I am indebted to Professors Jesse Burkhead, Alan Campbell, and Seymour Sacks for a number of helpful comments. The analysis and conclusions below are my own, and in no way do they necessarily reflect
those held by the International Monetary Fund.
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The objective in the sections below is to describe the model in conceptual terms and to
present a general summary of the statistical results of the analysis on 1960 data for central
cities of 198 metropolitan
areas. More specifically, the concern is with developing an a zyxwvutsrqpo
priori basis for these arguments and identifying and measuring proxy variables, primarily
by the nature of the interdependencies.
II.

THE

DETERMINANTS

Intraurban inteructions
The urban government fiscal problem as a result of intrametropolitan
spillovers is well
covered in the literature.
The catalyst of the metropolitan
fiscal imbalances
problem is
seen to be the secular industrial
and residential
movement
which has simultaneously
depleted the central city tax base and forced on it the dual responsibilities
of serving a high
cost, low income population
(much of which is elderly and Negro) and meeting the needs
of a sizeable commuter population.
It is hypothesized here that city expenditures
will be
greater to the extent intrametropolitan
city to suburb movements are not taking place, and
non-residents
provide a drain on core city services.
The city-suburb migration factor may be tied to fiscal homogeneity in the SMSA. The
implications
of variations in intrametropolitan fiscal homogeneity
for an explanation
of
intermetropolitan differences in per capita expenditures
can best be explained in terms of
the Tiebout thesis and the effects of expectations on the actions of public decision makers.
According to the Tiebout argument, intrametropolitan
differences in tax and service levels
will lead consumer-residents
to move toward the jurisdiction
offering what they consider
to be the best package of public goods [I]. If suburban communities
generally offer the
better package of public goods, and to the extent the Tiebout thesis is valid, the direction
of the intra-SMSA
migration will be toward the suburbs, the migrants being the middle
and higher income families.
Consequently,
it would follow that more fiscally uniform
SMSA’s may realize less centrifugal population movement.
Hence, public decision makers
of central city governments in these SMSA’s may be prone to plan for and carry out higher
levels of public services than those of core city governments
which do not have strong
expectations for holding higher and middle income residents.
The measurement
of a second, more direct effect of intraurban
interactions
on the
level of city expenditures involves examining the reasons for suburban resident trips to the
central city, i.e., it involves exploring
the nature of the urban-suburban
exploitation
hypothesis.
The non-resident
drain on core city services and public facilities tends to be
greater to the extent the central city is a retail sales center (the trip to shop), an employment
center (the trip to work), and contains the major libraries, auditoriums,
museums, and
theatres (the trip for entertainment).
Taking a cue from these prime causes of interaction,
empirical studies have indicated with some consistency that per capita spending in (or by)
the core city is more closely related to the size of the “contact”
population
than to the
number of people living within the city’s jurisdictional
limits [2]. Consequently,
the
measures used here to describe intercity variations in the per capita level of expenditures
are the ratio of central city to urban fringe population
(X5), the employment-population
ratio (XT), and per capita retail sales (XZ)*.
A popular argument
is that the fragmentation
of local government
results in an
inefficient allocation
of already limited public resources.
To the extent the amount of
* Retail sales is an appropriate measure of intercity difference in the degree to which the city attracts
nonresident shoppers, given that income level may be heid constant.
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fragmentation
varies across SMSA’s, the degree of inefficiency should also vary, i.e., the
number of government
units providing the same services in a metropolitan
area (X7) and
the level of spending for that service should be, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPON
cet. par., positively related.
General population characteristics

Many have argued that urban governments
experience internal economies of scale
(size), hence core city population
(Xl) is included here as an independent
variable.
These
economies or diseconomies of relative size may be distinguished
from economies of density
for analytical purposes;
i.e., decreasing unit costs for public services are a function,
not
only of the increment in the number of units served in the city, but also of the size of the
land area in which these units reside. To measure the effects of density, both population
per square mile (X4) and housing units per square mile (XZ) are initially included as independent variables.
The level of city spending would be expected also to vary directly with the wealth
stock of the community
as measured by property values and the nature of the industrial
base; and with factors reflecting the flow of wealth, such as the level and distribution
of
personal income.
Median family income (Xs) is included to reflect average income level,
while per cent of families with incomes less than $3,000 (X9) and greater than $10,000
(Xro) are used as measures of income distribution.
Per cent of non-white population
(X~S)
is also used as an alternative description of the level of poverty in the ci.ty. The industrial
composition
of the city is an important factor in determining
the differences in expenditure
levels, since local industry not only draws heavily on city services but via the local tax base
contributes substantially
to the city government purse. The per cent of labor force employed
in manufacturing
industries (Xn) is used here to differentiate among cities in the nature of
the economic base. Finally, median value of owner-occupied
dwelling units (X6) is taken
to be a general measure of the level of wealth in the community.
Fiscal variables

If a substantial
unexplained
variance in core city government
spending variations
remains after the above factors are accounted for, it would seem desirable to introduce
measures of differences in the financing arrangements
for public services, e.g., does a
heavier reliance on a consumer sales tax have a positive or negative marginal effect on the
level of per capita spending ? In specific question here are the expenditure level effects of
greater relative dependence on intergovernmental
aids, and on the property tax. The ratio
of intergovernmental
to general revenue (X13) is included as an independent
variable to
measure the effect of the relative importance of state aid in the local revenue structure, on
the level of city government
spending.
Property tax revenues as a fraction of total general
revenues (X15) is included to measure relative dependence
on the property tax or more
specifically, to attempt detection of some marginal effect which would indicate the nonresponsiveness
of the property tax to differences in needs.
Interrelationships

The most desirable approach to explaining public expenditure levels would be to first
use a priori reasoning and intercorrelations
among the explanatory
variables in order to
classify each as either a demand or cost influence, and then proceed in the statistical analysis.
However, it seems impossible to separate even on an a priori basis the demand from the
supply side. For example, the level and distribution
of incomes may be viewed as a demand
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factor in that the quality of public services a family desires is thought to be directly related
to their level of income. On the other hand, large proportions
of low income residents may
necessitate greater amounts of police protection.
To further complicate matters, higher
income levels generally mean higher revenue levels, giving the city government
a greater
capacity to supply public services. An alternative is to examine the effects of not specific
variables but groups of variables, i.e., a systematic examination
of the intercorrelations
may describe the multiplicity of socio-economic
and demographic characteristics
common
to metropolitan
areas. Two methods are offered here to unravel from this complicated
web of interdependency
an interpretation
of the general factors underlying the 17 variables.
First, a matrix of all possible zero order correlation
coefficients is presented in Table 1.
These data may be interpreted loosely to reveal certain general patterns which may enable
differentiation
among cities. For example, the more populous central cities show a tendency
to be more densely populated, to have larger proportions
of employment in manufacturing
industries,
higher mlemployment
rates, and to be located in more highly fragmented
(politically) SMSA’s. Then any importance
of population
as an explanatory variable may
be largely due to these other factors.
Consequently,
though it may not be possible to
partition clearly the separate effects of these variables, it is essential that the threads of
interrelationship
be woven together meaningfully.
The exclusive use of simple intercorrelations
to reduce the dimension of a model is
naive in the sense that no account is taken of higher order multivariable
interrelationships,
and in the sense that it does not provide a systematic determination
of the actual dimensions
of the problem.
Perhaps a less naive quantitative
approach to the problem of interdependency analysis is the method of principal components
131. This approach to determining
the dimensions of the problem involves deriving linear combinations
of the type

where the xj are the independent
variables and the coefficients n are chosen such that the
first principal component ii has as large a variance as possible, is is chosen to be orthogonal
to ii and to have as large a variance as possible, [s is chosen orthogonal to [i is, and has
and so on. The end result is a transformation
of the
as large a variance as possible;
original zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
p independent
variables into p uncorrelated
components,
ii. If yy1 < p of these
components explain a large proportion of the variance in the original independent
variables,
the dimensions of the problem are approximately
identified and one might justify the use
of m independent
variables in a final regression model. However, the serious problems
which remain are (a) exactly how much explained variation is to be considered a “large
and (b) which of the (p -m) independent
variables should be deleted.
proportion”;
A principal components
analysis was carried out on the 17 independent
variables for
the 198 metropolitan
core cities included in the sample*. The results, shown in Table 2,
reveal that three independent
variables may be removed at no cost at all, and that as few
as nine of the ii account for 90 per cent of the variance among the 17 explanatory variables.
Hence, both the naive examination
of the correlation coefficients and the principal components analysis indicate that the effective dimension number of the problem is considerably
less than 17. The effects of collinearities
and the identification
of effective dimension are
worthy and useful objectives, and are used extensively in the following analysis as a guide
in interpreting
the regression results; however, no attempt is made here to go so far as to
orthogonalize
the explanatory variables.
* Where an SMSA had more than one central city, only the largest was retained for this analysis.
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TABLE 1~. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Central City Population
Number of Dwellmg Units Per Square Mile

Percent Increase in City Population, 1950-1960
Population Density
Ratio of Central City to Urban Fringe Population
Median Value of Owner-Occupied Dwelling Units
Ratio of City Employment to City Population
Median Family Income
Perceni of Families with fncomes Less Than g3,ooO
Percent of Families with Incomes Greater Than $~~~~
Percent of City Employment in Manufacturing
Per Capita Retail Sales
Intergovernmental Revenue as a Percent of Total General Revenue
Percent of City Labor Force Unemployed
Property Tax Revenues as a Percent of Total General Revenue
Percent Nonwhite
Number of Gove~lenta~
Units

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Couniy and C%+yDais
zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONM
Book, 1962 (1952) (A Statistical Abstract
Supplement), U.S. Gavernment Printing Office, Washingt,on, D.C. 1963 (1953). U.S. Bureau
the Census,
Compendium of City Goverwwnt (1951), U.S. Government, Printing Office, Washington, DC., 3961 (1952).
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Eigen
value

Cumulative variance
explahrod

x
2
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3 .I095

0.25
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- 0.25
0.18

.:

I.9710
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:
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0
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0.87
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0.03
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12

0.4034
0.4&70
0.3239

0.95
0.93
0.97

0.03
0.02
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11:

0.1145
0.2528

0.99

0 “00
0.02

1:
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0.0464
0.0439
0.0046

1 .a0
.OO
1.00

0.01
0,oo
0.00

Component

* SeeTable

Contribution to
Explained variance

la

Per capita City Government Expenditures ale anaIyzed below as the dependent
variable in an aggregate form and for individual functions. The per capita expression is
not justified by any rigid theoretical fo~ulatio~,
but it is preferable to a per family% per
household, or per square mile basis because it can be compared with previous research,
and because there seems to be some merit in planning and evaluating service levels of
certain public programs on a per capita basis. Total expenditures are treated in three
different ways for purposes of analysis. The first is per capita total genera1 expenditures
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which includes both operating expenditures
and capital outlays, but is net of education
expenditures*.
In the second form, capital outlays are eliminated and current expenditures
(less education) are expressed on a per capita basis. Though measuring normal day-to-day
expenditures,
this dependent
variable is subject to the limitation
that the range of city
services is greater in some cities than in others, e.g., the city of Odessa, Texas makes no
current expenditures
for hospitals, health, welfare, or housing and urban renewal while
Worchester, Massachusetts
includes all of these in its city budget.
The third form of the dependent variable is per capita current expenditures
on the
common functions.
The common functions-those
supported more or less to the same
extent by all cities included in the study-are
police, fire, refuse collection, and other current
expenses for sanitation,
current expenses for roads and streets, parks and recreation, and
general control.
Finally, the common functions are expressed on individual
per capita
bases to analyze more clearly the effects of the explanatory variables.
A final limitation to be noted is that comparison
of dollar figures may not represent
the true among-city variation in per capita service levels because of wage rate variations
and quality differentials.
Though adjustment for quality differences would greatly enhance
the meaning of these results, it represents a sizable task beyond the scope of this paper [4].

III.

STATISTICAL

RESULTS

When all 17 variables
are introduced
into a single equation least squares model, 41
per cent of the variation in per capita total expenditures is explained (see Table 3) with six
independent
variables statistically significant (Column 1). The significant positive association with population
size suggests that larger cities offer a greater scope of public services
and therefore per capita expenditures are higher. The fact that population
is a significant
determinant
only for the total expenditure classes support this interpretation,
and conversely
would seem to leave little possibility for a case for diseconomies
of size. The positive
association
between per capita expenditures
and the ratio of intergovernmental
to total
revenues might also be explained in terms of intercity differences in the scope of services
provided, i.e., cities that receive relatively high proportions
of revenues in the form of aids
may be responsible for a broader package of services. But this variable is also significant
for non-aided
functions
such as per capita police expenditures,
which implies another
interpretation-that
relatively greater dependence on non-local sources, cet. par., results in
an over-all greater level of expenditures.
The percentage
employed and median home value both exhibit a positive partial
influence on the level of per capita total spending, which illustrates the dual effects of
income on the level of public services. That is, higher income families demand, expect, and
are able to support a higher level of public services, while the prevalence of large numbers
of lower income families in the central city results in higher costs for such municipal
services as police, fire, and refuse collection.
The positive association of expenditures with
the ratio of city employment
to city population
is consistent with the hypothesis that a
city’s expenditures
are higher if there is substantial
commuting
by non-residents
to work
in the central city. Finally, given the size of the labor force, greater proportions
of employment in manufacturing
tends to be associated with lower per capita expeditures.
A tentative explanation
is that since the wage structure in manufacturing
industries tends toward

* Because education expenditures constitute the largest single portion of total municipal outlays, but are
reported for only about one-third of the cities in this sample, they are excluded throughout this paper.

TABLE 3. RESULTS OF 17 VARIADLE ANALYSIS ON SELECTED PER CAPITA CITY GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES* FOR 198 CORE Crnr;s

Dependent

variable

Explained

variance

17 variable

Total

Total

current

Central

model

0.4080

of dwelling

of increase

population
Ratio

0.4562

0.4783

fringe

0.2659

0.2374

0.19015

(s)*

0.18443

(6)*

0.29681

(1)

0.31856

(1)

-0.03275

(17)

(13)

-0.05711

(13)

0.10581

(12)

0.8325

(13)

-0.05976

(15)

0.12495

(8)

0.17901

(6)

0.04938

(14)

-0.41983

(2)

0.74859

(1)

-0.81397

(2)

-0.57610

(1)

0.69201

(2)

(1950-1960)

-0.06893

(12)

-0.02891

(15)

-0.04040

(14)

-0.0594s
0.06353

(1 I)

0.17158

(15)

-0.21161

(15)

-0.06347

(14)

0.06801

(9)

-0.77151

(1)

-0.50271

(2)

I .00062 (1)

(15)

-0.00745

(16)

-0.00263

(16)

0.02712

0.00057

(17)

(4)*

0.28069

(2)

-0.86224

(1)

(17)

0.09603

(12)

-0.06549

(12)

city to urban

population

-0.03552

(15)

-0.04338

-0.00618

value of owner-occupied

dwelling
Ratio

0.2916

0.5075

0.6429
~~_____

in city

density

of central

Median

Parks

units per

square mile
Percentage
Population

Highways

variables:

city population

Number

Sanitation

functions
_

Independent

Fire

Police

C!Olll~O~

in

IN 1960

units

of city employment

city population
Median

family

Percentage
incomes
Percentage

income

of families

retail sales

Intergovernmental
percent
Percentage

revenue

of total general

Number

0.21814

(3)*

0.21657

(4)*

0.23928

-0.00298

(17)

0.00176

(17)

-0.11705

(10)

-0.06076

(12)

-0.10443

(11)

-0.12868

(7)

-0.26435

(3)

-0.19319

(4)*

-0.12615

(8)

-0.18664

(8)*

0.15195

(8)’

0.15256

(10)

0.09385

(10)

0.03763

(15)

(4)*

0.20450

(6)*

0.18609

(7)*

0.10419

(9)

0.14507

(8)

0.37755

(l)*

0.33063

(3)*

0.38134

(3)*

0.25670

(4)

0.04685

(14)

0.03754

(16)

0.00129

(17)

0.10080

(17)

0.00846

(16)

-0.12499

(9)

-0.01523

(16)

-0.14574

(IO)

-0.013849

-0.08796

(12)

-0.08311

(13)

-0.36251

(3)*

-0.18014

(7)*

-0.08385

-0.08407

-0.26730

(6)*

(7)s

0.10677

(11)

g

0.14063
0.35261

(10)
(4)

1

(11)

(13)

0.10053

(11)

0.04937

(13)

0.02860

(16)

0.20953

(6)*

0.14857

(9)*

0.16077

(9)*

0.15044

(5)

0.27384

(3)*

0.14620

(9)

- 0.24489

(2)*

0.23449

(3)*

0.15017

(II)*

0.13146

(II)’

0.24786

(6)*

0.13481

(7)

0.21027

(5)s

0.06050

(13)

0.15088

(8)*

0.15781

(9)*

0.32225

(12)

0.25926

(5)*

0.31457

(4)*

0.14903

(6)

0.15375

(7)

0.30692

(5)*

0.02401

(16)

0.05587

(14)

0.17115

(lo)*

0.12555

(12)*

0.299911

0.08243

(14)

0.11774

(10)

0.20559

(8)*

0.08086

(10)

0.22104

(5)*

0.32834

(4)*

0.11688

0.33395

(3)*

(16)

0.23640

(7)*

(13)

revenue

of labor force
tax re”enLleS as a percent

of total general
Percentage

0.019907

as a

unemployed
Property

(5)*

of city employment

in manufacturing
Per capita

0.20829

with incomes

greater than $10,000
Percentage

(6)*

with

less than $3,000
of families

0.18729
to

revenue

0.15059

of nonwhite
of governmental

* Beta Coefficients
the 0.05 level.

units

are shown

-0.15599

(9)
(7)

-0.23601

in each cell; number

in parenthesis

(2)*

(5)*
(12)

-0.02807

zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
-0 017640 (8)*
-0.09178
(11)
-0.04905
(14)
0.02287 (15)
-0.00585
(17)
0.07599 (14)

is ranking

of the size of Beta coefficient

(from

highest

to lowest);

and the asterisk

denotes

two-tail

significance

at
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a relatively great degree of equality, the over-all distribution
of income tends to be more
equal, therefore it follows from our “dual effect of income” hypothesis that per resident
expenditures will be lower.
Though a greater amount of per capita current expenditures
may be explained, the
significant explanatory
variables are approximately
the same, still reflecting the scale of
government
services, the dual income effect, the size of the contact population,
and the
dependence on intergovernmental
assistance.
One exception is the negative significance of
the number of governmental
units within the SMSA with property taxing power, which
may be interpreted
as showing that if functional
responsibility
is more fractionated,
the
scope of public services provided by the core city government is smaller. Again, the reasons
for the level of unexplained variance are to be found partially in intercity differences in the
division of functional responsibility,
i.e., the higher levels of per capita total expenditures
reflect not only higher levels of need, demand, or quality, but also the city government’s
responsibility
for a greater number of public functions and/or sub-functions.
This hypothesis may be tested by examining the common function form of the dependent variable.
Only slightly more of the variance in per capita common function expenditures
(48
per cent) may be explained, the significant independent
variables not differing substantially
from those obtained for total and total current expenditures.
But three additional findings
are worth mention.
First, per cent nonwhite enters at a positive and significant level
reinforcing the thesis that large proportions
of low income residents exert a strong upward
pressure on core city spending levels. Second, cities with a greater relative dependence on
property taxes spend greater per capita amounts.
To interpret literally the significant
property tax variable, a 1 per cent difference in the property tax as a proportion
of all
general revenues is accompanied
by a $13 difference in per capita city expenditures.
It is
important here not to draw a temporal inference from this finding. Since these data show
expenditures
to be higher by city governments
placing a greater reliance on the property
tax, it does not necessarily follow that the property tax responds adequately to changes in
income in urban areas.
The third interesting pattern displayed by these data is the positive significance of both
relative dependence on intergovernmental
aids and relative dependence on property taxes.
This suggests the surprising possibility that, cet. par., core cities placing least reliance on
nonproperty
taxes demonstrate
the ability to finance a higher level of services. However,
the limitations
imposed by the use of cross-section
data and multi-collinearity
constrain
one from jumping quickly to a conclusion that local property taxes are somehow more
adequate than sales or income levies.
The relatively high proportion
of the intercity variance in police expenditures
which
may be explained (64 per cent) is due in part to the greater homogeneity
of the datapolice services are generally a local function everywhere and special district arrangements
within core cities are not common.
The level of per capita police expenditures seems most
responsive to variations in a general density-poverty
factor and to variations in the size of
the contact population.
The importance
of population
density, percentage of nonwhites,
and percentage unemployed,
in explaining variations in police expenditures
results from
the lower economic status of residents in the more crowded urban areas, or of the Negro
population
in general. Further, higher population
densities may lead to greater vehicular
and pedestrian
traffic control problems,
thereby creating a higher level of per person
policing requirements.
When 17 independent
variables are examined, both the ratio of
city employment to city population
(which measures the extent to which workers commute
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to jobs within the central city) and per capita retail sales (which, given the level of income,
measures the extent to which shoppers make use of city retail establishments)
are significantly and positively related to the level of police expenditures.
This is again consistent
with the contact population
hypothesis, that the greater the extent to which nonresidents
of the city come within the jurisdiction
of the local police force, the greater will be the cost
of providing police services.
The 17 independent
variables jointly account for approximately
51 per cent of the
variation in per capita fire expenditures.
An examination
of the pattern of intercorrelation,
and a ranking of the Beta coefficients shows the density factor to exert a strong positive
influence on the level of spending for fire protection.
Increased fire hazards are likely to
result in more densely populated areas because of more inaccessible buildings, fewer fire
breaks, and greater congestion.
The importance of the unemployment
rate as a determinant
may be traced along similar lines, since higher unemployment
levels generally are associated
with lower grade housing and more densely populated areas. Conversely, median family
income exerts a positive influence on the level of city spending for fire protection, possibly
reflecting the demands of higher income core city residents or similarly, the higher value of
real property in the core city area. The significance of per capita retail sales (given the level
of income) and the city employment-population
ratio may reflect the increased fire protection burden thrust on the central city by nonresident
immigration.
Finally, it may be
noted that in SMSA’s with greater levels of political fragmentation
(to the extent that
fragmentation
be measured by the number of governmental
units), the core city government makes lower per capita expenditures
for fire protection.
If this local government
proliferation
is a proxy for core city decline in industrial
and commercial
activity, the
negative relationship
may reflect a reduction in nonresidential
demands for central city
fire services.
Roughly 30 per cent of the variation in per capita sanitation
expenditures
may be
explained.
Widely varying methods of financing and administering
the sanitation function
results in a discrepancy between sanitation expenditures
in the central city and sanitation
this partially explains the low explained variance.
expenditures
by the city government;
However, the general poverty-density
factor is observed to be significant at a positive level.
The importance
of population
density reflects the more intensive collection and disposal
services required by heavy pedestrian
and automobile
traffic and by large commercial,
wholesale, and market areas. Furthermore,
refuse collection is more regular and more
extensive in the densely populated,
predominantly
nonwhite areas, rellecting the higher
cost of serving run-down neighborhoods.
Because of similar data comparability
problems, the variance explained in per capita
current road-street expenditures is relatively low (about 27 per cent), though three variables
exert an expected effect. First, intergovernmental
revenue as a fraction of total general
revenue is significant at a positive level because higher proportions
of aid in the revenue
structure may indicate that a given city has a greater direct fiscal responsibility
for the
highway function.
Second, population
density is expectedly significant at a positive level,
because greater densities mean that the physical mileage per person which must be maintained will fall. Third, the partial effect of core city population
growth rate is negative,
indicating that street maintenance
is a function of streets and not of people; therefore the
growth of population in the already-built-up
areas (the core city) merely enables the cost to
be “spread” over a greater number of residents.
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IMPLICATIONS

From this statistical analysis, several general conclusions
may be drawn and certain
policy implications
offered [5]. Two basic determinants
of city government
spending
levels are uncovered;
(a) the size of the metropolitan
area population
relative to that in
the central city, and (b) a dual effect of income. Per capita core city government expenditures
are found to be lower in SMSA’s where the central city comprises a greater fraction of the
area population.
That is, where nonresident
“contact”
population
is relatively great, a
greater upward pressure is exerted on expenditures
by suburban trips to the city for the
Then spatial equity within SMSA’s would
purposes of work, shopping, or amusements.
require that these nonresidents
compensate
the city government
adequately for services
provided. It follows that cities relying almost exclusively on property taxes have little chance
to capture the costs imposed by nonresident
users. State assistance is more likely to aggravate this fiscal deficiency than improve it, in light of the past record of most state governments which shows a higher level of aid to suburbs than to core cities.
The second major factor explaining variations in the level of per resident city government spending is the nature of the local income distribution.
The findings presented in the
previous section may be interpreted as showing that large proportions
of the population
at
either extreme in the city income distribution
exert a significant upward pressure on the
level of spending.
Families in the higher income brackets tend to levy a positive effect via
the demand for a higher quality of services and through their effect on the local tax base.
Alternatively,
high proportions
of families with incomes below the poverty level occasion
greater per resident costs in the provision of certain services-partially
because of the higher
costs of servicing their run-down neighborhoods.
Then one might offer the very general
observation that, cet. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
par., the more equal the distribution
of income, the lower the level of
per capita core city expenditures.
The significance of intergovernmental
aids as an explanatory factor must be attributed
in large part to intercity variations in the division of direct state-local responsibility.
But
the consistency of this finding across aided and nonaided functions-that
cities depending
more heavily on intergovernmental
assistance spend more per capita-tempts
one to take
the “high-powered-state-money”
position,
that the “pass-down”
of funds ultimately
results in a greater level of expenditures
via some stimulative
effect on local revenues.
Definitive support for this argument, however, must await extensive empirical analysis of
city government revenues, and probably an approach more suitable than a single equation
regression analysis.
Fourth, the direct and interactive effects of the significant variables indicate that a
certain type of city is more likely to require and/or desire a higher level of spending.
In
general, this city is large, densely populated, and has a relatively high proportion of families
at each extreme of the income distribution
(or a relatively unequal distribution
of income
in any case), and has a “contact population”
which relative to its own is quite large. Conversely, one would expect lower expenditures
by city governments
to the extent the population is both smaller and less congested, the income distribution
is more equal, and a
larger proportion
of the SMSA population
lives within the corporate boundaries
of the
central city.
Finally, the regression
results show that certain public functions
are specifically
affected by particular needs factors. Studies of city government
spending (including this
one) have shown with some consistency that current highway expenditures
are inversely
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related to population
density (reflecting a lower physical mileage per person to be maintained) and police and fire spending are higher where ghetto conditions are most severe.
These five general and overlapping conclusions may be drawn about the nature of the
determinants
of core city spending. It might be worth turning also to the question of what
these statistical results do not show i.e., which hypothesis about the structure of metropolitan
city expenditures are not supported here.
First, these data give no evidence of the existence of economies of size (scale) since the
partial effect of population is not negatively related to any per capita expenditure category
considered, and in the only cases where size does exert a significant effect on spending, the
direct association is positive. Second, the number of metropolitan
local governments
with
property taxing power is not found to be significantly and positively related to per capita
cityy expenditures in all cases. However, this finding could be construed to mean that (a)
fragmented local government
is not inefficient (from a point-of-view
of municipal costs),
(b) fragmented local government is inefficient, but the measured effects of this variable are
obscured by collinearities in the data, and/or (c) this variable is not an appropriate measure
of governmental
fragmentation.
At any rate, time series data and some measure of output
would be needed to empirically
substantiate
the fragmentation-inefficiency
argument.
Finally, to return to the opening section and basic premise of this paper, this analysis does
not give strong empirical support to the argument
that greater intergovernment
fiscal
homogeneity
within the SMSA will result in high levels of spending by core city governments. But again, the failure to support the argument here may be in part due to an
inappropriate
measurement
of fiscal uniformity within the metropolitan
area.
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